Introduction
The turn to austerity in the aftermath of the recent economic crisis has been controversial, not least in Britain. Some have argued on the basis of historical evidence that fiscal consolidation is counter-productive in that it makes the public finances worse not better (Chick and Pettifor 2010) . A similar point was made by Keynes (1933) in urging the British government to raise government spending to tackle unemployment. Keynes was writing when Britain was a "depressed economy" and at a time when the multiplier had just been "discovered". 1 Ceteris paribus, selfdefeating austerity is more likely the higher is the multiplier and it is frequently predicted that multipliers will be large when interest rates are low and unemployment is high as in 1930s' Britain. A very high profile statement of this position was made recently by DeLong and Summers: "policies of austerity may well be counter-productive even by the yardstick of reducing the burden of financing the national debt in the future. Austerity in a depressed economy can erode the long-run fiscal balance. Stimulus can improve it" (2012, p. 234) .
There was a good deal of variation in fiscal policy in Britain during the 1930s. There were successive phases in which, first, expenditure cuts and tax increases were imposed in an attempt to return to budget balance in the face of adverse shocks from the world economic crisis and, second, rearmament accompanied by deficit finance comprised a large expansionary fiscal shock in the context of facing up to the threat from Nazi Germany. Interestingly, the public debt-to-GDP ratio rose during the former and fell during the latter phase. An outline of the fiscal landscape is provided in table 1. Prima facie, it may seem that the claim of self-defeating austerity is plausible given that the debt ratio fell when the policy of fiscal consolidation was reversed and this is indeed an episode that Chick and Pettifor (2010) cite in support of their argument.
In fact, there is no serious analysis of the claim of self-defeating austerity as applied to the depressed economy of 1930s' Britain; this article aims to fill that gap. We proceed as follows. In Section 2, various concepts of self-defeating austerity are reviewed and the conditions under which they would obtain are outlined. In Section 3, we consider econometric estimates of the government-expenditure multiplier and conclude that it was much lower than that has traditionally been believed. Informed by these estimates, in Section 4 we review the evidence for self-defeating austerity. In Section 5, we extend the analysis to examine the possibility that there was a "fiscal free lunch" in the sense of DeLong and Summers (2012) . Section 6 concludes.
Self-defeating austerity: concepts
In discussing "self-defeating austerity" it is important to be clear on the definition and time horizon of the concept. Thus, we can distinguish between the implications of deficit-financed expenditure for the absolute size of the public debt or, as is more common, for the public debt-to-GDP ratio. In the context of the latter, it is also important to consider the likely difference between the short-and long-run impacts of deficit finance.
It is well known that the condition for deficit-financed government expenditure to be selffinancing, in the sense that the total stock of government debt does not increase, is that m . 1/t, where m is the government-expenditure multiplier and t is the marginal tax and transfer rate. In this case, the additional tax revenue and lower transfer payments will cover the extra borrowing. This is the topic of the discussion in Keynes (1933) , which shows that he was well aware of this condition and that he did not really believe it to be satisfied at the time because the multiplier was probably not large enough. Keynes provided a lower bound calculation based in effect on m ¼ 1.5 and t ¼ 0.43 and an alternative which he seemed to view as more realistic based on m ¼ 2.0 and t ¼ 0.43 and concluded that the impact on tax and transfer payments would offset nearly half and perhaps two-thirds of the initial government borrowing.
It is also well known that the steady-state condition for the public debt-to-GDP ratio to be stabilized is that b = P(R − g), where b is the primary budget surplus-to-GDP ratio, P is the public debt-to-GDP ratio, R is the real rate of interest on government debt (which equals i, the nominal interest rate on government debt, minus p, the rate of inflation), and g is the growth rate of real GDP. The required primary budget surplus increases with the debt-to-GDP ratio and with the excess of the real interest rate on government debt minus the growth rate of real GDP. Of course, if the interest rate/growth rate differential is negative it is possible to stabilize the debt ratio while running a primary budget deficit. An analogous expression can be obtained to permit ex-post accounting for changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio over a period of time, from, say, t = 0 to t = T (Abbas et al. 2011) . This is
This decomposes the change in P, ∇P T = P T − P 0 , into a term which is the cumulative effect of the interest rate/growth rate differential, a term which is the cumulative primary deficit and a cumulative residual term which will reflect valuation effects, "below-the-line" fiscal operations such as privatizations, and errors in the data. Fiscal consolidation will have implications for b but may also affect R − g. In the short term g will decrease if the fiscal multiplier is positive and it is possible that R will change in response to fiscal adjustment. Moreover, the impact on b will reflect both the discretionary change in fiscal stance and, in the short run, the implications for the primary balance from repercussions of the multiplier on tax revenues and transfer payments.
Recent discussions of "self-defeating austerity", e.g., Holland and Portes (2012) , have focused on the initial impact of government borrowing on the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Assuming away any changes to R, the condition for this to decrease initially is that m . 1/(P + t), which might be satisfied relatively easily, especially when the debt ratio is high, as was the case in the 1930s. Indeed, with P at about 1.7, by implication, Keynes would have expected the initial impact of deficit-financed expenditure in the early 1930s to be a reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. However, this favorable outcome would be reversed once the impact on GDP of the temporary boost to government expenditure died away because the stock of debt would have been permanently increased. 2 A further permutation in this debate has been provided by DeLong and Summers (2012) . Their criterion is that a fiscal expansion is self-financing if it generates enough future tax revenue and/or reductions in outlays to cover the interest payments on the additional stock of debt that the initial borrowing entails. This requires the following condition to be satisfied.
whereẎ is the trend rate of growth of real GDP, and h is a hysteresis parameter defined as the per cent reduction in the flow of potential future output per percentage-point-year of the presentperiod output gap. The idea here is that, if depressed levels of output today have large enough permanent costs in terms of GDP lost, for reasons such as reductions in labor force skills or the 2 The implications of fiscal consolidation for P are reviewed in Boussard et al. (2012) . Their approach takes into account possible repercussions on the interest rate/growth rate differential and cyclical effects on the primary balance. They find that the typical time horizon for a consolidation during crisis periods to reduce the debt ratio is about two to three years depending on the time it takes for the multiplier effect to evaporate and the interest rate response in the market for government debt.
Self-defeating austerity 111 capital stock, then, if these costs can be avoided by deficit-financed temporary government spending, this will be self-financing -a fiscal "free lunch". Clearly, the possibility of self-defeating austerity or a fiscal free lunch turns on the size of the fiscal multiplier and advocates of these claims typically argue that they only hold in "depressed economy" conditions when multipliers may be much larger than normal. Most estimates of fiscal multipliers for interwar Britain are quite old. The methods they employed to obtain estimates of the multiplier are open to challenges and are not those which would be used by macroeconomists today. They do, however, suggest that the multiplier may have been much higher than would be assumed nowadays in "normal conditions".
Thus, estimates of the government-expenditure multiplier of 0.98 in the short run and 1.44 in the long run were obtained by Thomas (1981) based on a simulation of a Keynesian macroeconometric model, and estimation of an IS-LM model gave a value of 1.22 for the fiscal multiplier in Broadberry (1986) . Thomas (1983) looked at the impact of rearmament using an approach based on an input -output table and a social accounting matrix which assumes no crowding out and concluded that the government-expenditure multiplier was 1.64 in 1935 and 1.60 in 1938. Hatton (1987) surveyed this literature and concluded that it was appropriate to think in terms of a range of values between 1.25 and 1.75 for the multiplier. Finally, Dimsdale and Horsewood (1995) , who incorporated aggregate supply with a high degree of nominal inertia as well as aggregate demand into a macro-econometric model for the interwar period, concluded that the short run multiplier was about 1.5 and the long run as much as 2.5.
Revisiting the multiplier in interwar Britain
The models that these articles rely upon basically embody Keynesian ideas in their specification with a traditional consumption function and may not adequately reflect crowding out, with the implication that the estimated multipliers are too large. None of these articles is based on models in either the neoclassical or new-Keynesian traditions which embody optimizing behavior by forward-looking households. These are models which typically expect consumer expenditure to fall rather than rise in response to an increase in government expenditure and envisage that the multiplier may be less than one. 3 The implications of deficit-financed government purchases in models with optimizing, forward-looking households are reviewed in Ramey (2011a) . She pointed out that the key channels through which fiscal policy affects the private economy are wealth effects, inter-temporal substitution effects, and distortionary taxation. Government purchases financed by future taxation will reduce household's wealth. This can be expected to reduce consumer expenditure but raise labor supply and thus real GDP. If increased future income taxes are expected, work effort may be switched from the future to the present, and if real interest rates rise, private expenditure will be reduced. These inter-temporal effects tend to intensify the wealth effects. The net effect is typically a positive multiplier but quite possibly below one. Ramey (2011a) concluded that the evidence for the USA suggests that the government-expenditure multiplier lies between 0.8 and 1.5 and that it perhaps varies contingent on the state of the economy which will affect the extent of crowding out.
Two contingencies that potentially affect the size of the multiplier are especially relevant with regard to Britain in the 1930s, namely, the very low level of nominal interest rates and the large overhang of public debt. When interest rates are at the lower bound, some models predict that the multiplier will be unusually large and probably well above one, in particular if expansionary fiscal policy creates expectations of future inflation and reduces real interest rates. 4 It should, however, be noted that this prediction depends on why the economy is in the liquidity trap and it will not apply if the reason is a state of low confidence (Mertens and Ravn 2014) . When public debt-to-GDP ratios are high, the empirical evidence suggests that multipliers tend to be very low, even during recessions (Ilzetski et al. 2010; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2013) , perhaps because Ricardian equivalence effects are stronger (Rohn 2010) .
A big problem in estimating multipliers is the validity of the identification assumptions that are made, in particular, whether adjustments to fiscal policy can be treated as exogenous and unanticipated. One promising approach to this issue is to develop narrative histories of fiscal policy. Examples include Cloyne (2013) , who developed a classification of changes in tax policy which yielded a series of exogenous tax changes for Britain post-World War II, and Ramey (2009) , who generated a series of "defence news" shocks for the USA based on reports of future changes of military expenditure plans.
All this suggests that a fresh look at the size of the multiplier in 1930s' Britain using modern techniques is desirable. It is now possible to revisit the question of the size of the fiscal multiplier using time-series econometrics rather than relying on a traditional macroeconomic model, as has been the practice hitherto, thanks to the development of a quarterly series for real GDP for the interwar UK economy by Mitchell et al. (2012) . 5 In undertaking this task, we make use of the "defence news" approach to resolving the endogeneity of government expenditure pioneered by Ramey (2011b) and also adopted by Barro and Redlick (2011) .
The idea of "defence news" is to reflect changes to planned government defence expenditure previously unanticipated by the public. This variable can be thought of as capturing exogenous shocks to a key component of government spending. Our key source is The Economist magazine, which was published weekly throughout the interwar period. The Economist gave a detailed yearly account of actual spending at the time of the annual budget in April. It also published quarterly running totals at the beginning of January, April, July, and October each year. In order to construct the series for "defence news", we examined every issue of The Economist from 1919 through 1938 and compiled a complete log of all entries relating to defence expenditure. The relevant material includes reports of defense estimates, announcements of policy changes with possible spending implications, special reports such as those on air-force and naval expenditure in February 1936, commentaries on the credibility of government estimates and announcements, and predictions of future developments.
Using this log we made an estimate of the present discounted value of defense expenditure for 1920q1 and then updated it each quarter until 1938q4. 6 In moving forward through time, for each quarter we compiled a present value figure based on the information set available in the previous quarter and one using the current information. The difference between the two estimates is "defence news" for the quarter. Expected values were calculated at 1938 prices for a horizon of five years using a discount rate of 5.1 percent. 7 It should be noted that the 4 Such a model in the New Keynesian tradition is provided by Christiano et al. (2011) ; for an application of this approach in a calibrated model designed to examine the impact of the 1930s' New Deal in the USA, see Eggertsson (2008) . 5 These estimates are derived using data on annual GDP, quarterly industrial production, and monthly economic indicators published in The Economist. An econometric technique is then deployed to obtain monthly GDP from these ingredients. The approach does not provide estimates of the components of national expenditure. 6 Further details and discussion can be found in Crafts (2012) and Crafts and Mills (2013) . 7 Figures in current prices have been converted to constant 1938 prices using the monthly retail price index in Capie and Collins (1983, table 2.13 ) and the discount rate is 1.25 percent per quarter. We experimented with several other values Self-defeating austerity 113 observations for "defence news" in 1935 through 1937 are abnormally large at a time when there must have been considerable uncertainty at the time both about the detail of the government's rearmament plans and the extent to which they would be implemented. This could lead to downward-biased estimates of the normal government-expenditure multiplier either because the "defence news" numbers are outliers or if they are unreliable. Accordingly, in what follows we present results both for a full interwar sample period and also for a period truncated at 1934q4, which omits the potentially problematic years at the end. The data required for our econometric analysis are taken from well-known sources. In particular, estimates of government expenditure on a quarterly basis have been taken from The Economist. The sources are listed in Appendix A.
Estimates by Crafts and Mills
A recent article by Crafts and Mills (2013) suggested a different approach to estimating the government-expenditure multiplier for interwar Britain using time-series econometrics and quarterly data rather than relying on a traditional macroeconomic model estimated with annual data. Their methodology also took advantage of the "defence-news methodology" pioneered by Ramey (2011b) to address the troublesome issue of the endogeneity of government expenditure. The resulting estimates suggested that the multiplier was considerably lower than hitherto supposed with point estimates ranging from 0.3 to 0.8 depending on the model specification and sample period. Crafts and Mills (2013) employed an approach similar to that of Barro and Redlick (2011) . This has the following general specification:
Here news is defense news divided by the one-quarter lagged value of real GDP, D t is the level of defense spending, and ∇y t = log(GDP t /GDP t−1 ) is quarterly real GDP growth. The sample periods run from 1922q1 to 1938q4 and from 1922q1 to 1934q4. Starting in 1922 avoids the immediate aftermath of World War 1, which is known to have produced a shift in the process generating GDP. 8 Truncating the sample period at the end of 1934 removes the period when war was imminent and when there were some announcements of very large future defense spending which are not easy to quantify.
The lag length was set at four to model any seasonality present in the data (seasonally unadjusted data were used throughout). The contemporaneous term of news was included but all other variables were lagged to avoid problems of endogeneity. The control variables included were lags of export growth, changes in the money multiplier, consol yields and the tax rate, and the unemployment rate. 9 Growth rates and changes were used to ameliorate problems caused by the non-stationarity of many of the variables when expressed as levels.
reflecting rates on government bonds in different years and found that the "defence news" series and the multiplier estimates are not sensitive to this choice. 8 See, for example, Mills (1991) . 9 In selecting these controls we have followed Barro and Redlick (2011) in allowing for monetary conditions, other fiscal variables, and the degree of slack in the economy.
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The error term u t was specified as the ARCH(1) process u 2 t = d 0 + d 1 u 2 t−1 , which effectively models the volatility of GDP growth during 1926 and 1927 and precludes the need for lagged values of GDP growth to be included as regressors: including such lags with u t assumed to be homoskedastic leads to a significant deterioration of fit. Table 2 reports the Crafts and Mills (2013) estimates based on a final specification in which insignificant variables have been deleted, standard errors are robust to possible residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, and the reported equation passes a variety of standard tests for misspecification. 10 The news variable is significantly positive at lags of one and two quarters with coefficients estimated to be, with one-standard error bounds, 0.0325 + 0.0025 and 0.0179 + 0.0039.
Barro and Redlick's multiplier definition is based on using annual data with single lags of the regressors. The quarterly counterpart is m = 4 i=1 (16b 1i + b 2i ). Given the estimates in table 2 the multiplier is m = 0.45 + 0.13. For the period truncated at 1934q4, the estimated multiplier is m = 0.81 + 0.37.
Two further econometric exercises in Crafts and Mills (2013) confirmed that the multiplier was probably less than one. First, the impact of government expenditure on private expenditure was estimated using a model proposed by Ramey (2012) . This showed a significant negative relationship and confirmed the existence of incomplete crowding out. The implied multipliers were 0.77 for the full sample and 0.72 for the shorter sample period. Second, a more general model specification was tried which fitted the data somewhat better but has no exact counterpart in the macroeconomics literature. This related changes in output growth, ∇y t , again to lags of news t , but now to lags of government spending growth disaggregated into defense and nondefense spending, ∇d t and ∇non-d t , and lags of non-government spending (private expenditure on consumption, investment, and net exports) growth, ∇n t , all growth variables again being defined as one-quarter changes in the logarithms:
However, there may also be "indirect" effects because news may have influence on other various categories of spending that also matter to GDP growth. Regressions of the form ∇z t = g 0 + 4 i=1 g i ∇z t−i + u i news t−i + v t were therefore estimated for z, respectively, defined as ∇d, ∇non-d and ∇n. These were then inserted into Equation (4) to obtain a set of indirect multipliers and an overall multiplier, defined as the sum of the direct and indirect multipliers. The estimated total overall multiplier was 0.34 on an annualized basis which is fully realized after three years. For the truncated period ending at 1934q4 the estimate of the annualized total multiplier was 0.76. 11 We now explore the robustness of these results using the same dataset but exploring some alternative methodologies and explicitly examining the issue of whether the multiplier was higher during the period when unemployment was at its peak similarly to Owyang et al. (2013) .
VAR analyses
Following the framework outlined by Ramey (2012) , we consider computing impulse responses, and hence multipliers, using the VAR system
with x t = (z t , gov t , y t , tax t , r t ) ′ : here gov t and y t are the logarithms of government spending and real GDP, z t is a variable that distinguishes the alternative systems introduced below, tax t is the tax rate and r t an interest rate; d t contains a quadratic trend and seasonal dummies and is thus consistent with the exercises reported in Ramey (2011b Ramey ( , 2012 . This ordering of the variables in x t is used in the Choleski decomposition leading to the calculation of impulse responses and hence multipliers from three choices of x t :
1. Blanchard -Perotti structural VAR (SVAR): Blanchard and Perotti (2002) omit z t entirely and identify the shock to government spending as the innovation to gov t , now ordered first in the Choleski decomposition. 2. Perotti SVAR: Perotti (2014) sets z t = d t , the logarithm of defence spending. The government spending shock is then the innovation to d t . 3. Ramey News Expectational VAR (EVAR): Ramey (2011b) sets z t = news t , which is her "defense news" variable divided by lagged GDP. The innovation to this variable is thus identified as the government spending shock. Self-defeating austerity 117 multiplier is negative whereas the Perroti SVAR and Ramey EVAR multipliers are both in the region of 0.7. Unfortunately, the precision with which these multipliers can be estimated is rather poor, the standard error to be attached to the Ramey EVAR multiplier being in the region of 0.65 while that for the Perotti SVAR multiplier being over 2.8.
Local projection
In contrast to estimating a fully specified VAR over a complete sample period, Owyang et al. (2013) employ Jorda's (2005) local projection technique to compute impulse responses and hence multipliers by adopting a specification which allows the sample to be separated into recessions and expansions. 12 This approach estimates the following pair of "growth" regressions for each horizon h:
Y t and G t are the levels of GDP and government expenditure, so that the dependent variables in Equations (6) and (7) are, approximately, y t+h − y t−1 and (g t+h − g t−1 )(G t−1 /Y t−1 ), respectively. Consequently, the coefficients in the two equations are measured in the same units. REC t is a dummy variable that takes the value unity when t is designated to be in the recessionary state R and zero when t is in the expansionary state E. The h-quarter-ahead impulse responses with respect to news in the two states are given by the b i,j,h coefficients (i = Y , G; j = R, E), from which multipliers may be calculated in various ways: for example, the k-quarter "integral" measure may be calculated as
As an example of this approach, when the recessionary state (REC t = 1) is defined as the period 1930q4 to 1938q4 the 16-quarter integral multiplier measure is 0.62 while the similar multiplier for the expansionary state is 20.09. 14 Various other choices for the recessionary 12 An extension of this technique by Jorda and Taylor (2013) has recently been used to examine the austerity aspects of recent fiscal policy in the UK. 13 Equations (5) and (6) are consistently estimated by OLS although for inference HAC standard errors should be used to deal with the autocorrelation induced into the error for horizons greater than one quarter. The lag order was set at p ¼ 5 on the basis of information criteria. 14 This choice is motivated by real GDP being below the trend growth line throughout this period.
118
European Review of Economic History state were investigated based, for example, on defining "high" and "low" unemployment episodes. However, the multipliers, both integral and peak, proved to be very erratic across states and our conclusion is that, for this particular data set, the local projection method fails to provide any useful and reliable multiplier estimates. It should be noted, however, that we did not obtain a multiplier greater than 0.7 for any of the periods that we experimented with as the "recessionary state". 15 We conclude that the wide range of econometric techniques that we have used to interrogate the new quarterly dataset point to estimates of the multiplier for interwar Britain that are well below what has traditionally believed. The highest point estimate is about 0.8 with the preponderance of estimates being a little lower than this. There is no convincing evidence that the multiplier was higher in the period of a "depressed economy". It must be accepted, however, that estimation of fiscal multipliers is difficult, especially for short sample periods, and that some methods do not deliver precise estimates.
Self-defeating austerity: evidence
We begin by accounting for the decline in the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the years after 1933 (table 1) at a time when first fiscal consolidation was mildly reversed and then rearmament transformed fiscal policy. Table 3 provides the ingredients for the formula of Abbas et al. (1972); g, fourth quarter real GDP growth rate, from Mitchell et al. (2012) . Note: b * is the required primary budget surplus-to-GDP ratio to satisfy the condition that ∇P = 0, where ∇P = −b+ (i − p − g). 15 Our findings are quite similar to those of Ramey and Zubairy (2014) , who have used similar techniques for the USA. They conclude that the multiplier is generally less than one and that the null hypotheses of no difference between periods of slack and normal times or between periods of very low interest rates and normal times cannot be rejected. They also note that results from the local projection technique are erratic.
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The results from using this formula to account ex-post for changes in the debt ratio are that 22.8 of the 35.4 percentage points decline between 1933 and 1938 came from primary budget surpluses and 9.3 percentage points came from a favorable interest rate/growth rate differential leaving 3.3 percentage points as the residual contribution. Although fiscal policy was relaxed quite considerably in the late 1930s, table 3 shows that primary budget surpluses, albeit smaller, continued and most of the reduction in the debt ratio came from this source. Once the differential between the real interest rate and the real growth rate had turned negative, it would have been possible to run modest primary budget deficits and still have stabilized P. 16 Thus, rearmament was consistent with continuing falls in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Table 3 reflects a stark difference between the conditions prevailing in the late 1930s and the late 1920s and, in effect, the major change in the fiscal arithmetic that was occasioned by Britain's exit from the gold standard. In the context of Britain's high debt ratio, the legacy of World War I, price deflation, and the interest rate policies required to defend the exchange rate made stabilizing the debt ratio an onerous task. The post-gold standard era was one of "cheap money", i.e., a policy run by HM Treasury which entailed holding nominal interest rates down with debt management as a major consideration -a form of "financial repression" -as well as monetary stimulus (Howson 1975) .
Turning explicitly to self-defeating austerity, we can combine our estimates of the multiplier with those for t, the marginal tax and transfer rate, provided by Middleton (1985, table 7 .3) to evaluate the formulae discussed in Section 2. These are that t averaged 0.44 in the early 1930s, very similar to the lower bound calculation in Keynes (1933) . This means that for deficitfinanced government expenditure not to raise the stock of government debt, which requires that m . 1/t, the required value of m was 2.28. This condition surely was not met -Keynes was right, albeit much too optimistic about the size of the multiplier which was probably only about half his lower-bound estimate of 1.5. On the other hand, it seems possible that the condition that fiscal consolidation raised the debt-to-GDP ratio initially, m . 1/(P + t), was realized, in particular because P was very high. Given that P = 1.7 and t = 0.44, m . 0.47 would satisfy this condition.
To explore more fully the implications of the relaxation of fiscal policy for the debt ratio, we need to consider its impact on the components of the accounting formula (Equation (1)). This will comprise both its structural and its cyclical effects on the primary balance and on the interest rate/growth rate differential. In what follows, we assume that in the cheap money environment the authorities were able to neutralize any impact on the interest rate. The fiscal multiplier is assumed to affect both the cyclical impact on the primary balance and the growth rate.
The results reported in tables 4 and 5 fill out the implications of removing the post-1933 fiscal expansion (including, of course, rearmament) on the structural primary balance by assuming that the constant employment surplus was maintained at the 1933 level. The impact of this change on the cyclical component of the primary balance is taken to be mt × the cumulative change in fiscal stance, i.e., it is assumed that multiplier effects do not die away in the "depressed-economy" conditions of the 1930s. The counterfactual public debt ratio under alternative assumptions about the multiplier can be compared with the actual debt ratio after adjusting for the residual component in the accounting decomposition.
In table 4 , the full value of the multiplier is assumed to be reached in year 1. For m = 0.45 (for which value m , 1/(P + t)) we see that maintaining the fiscal squeeze would have resulted 16 The change in real interest rates between the early and later 1930s is well documented in Chadha and Dimsdale (1999) .
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European Review of Economic History in lower debt ratios throughout. For the other values of m, the counterfactual debt ratio in the first year is higher, i.e., there is self-defeating austerity in the sense of Holland and Portes (2012) . For m = 0.75, the "perverse" impact on the debt ratio ends in the third year but for the higher values reported in the table continuing austerity produces a higher value of the debt ratio after five years, given that the multiplier does not fade away. However, the econometric evidence provided in Section 3 and elsewhere suggests that the short-run value of the multiplier is a good deal lower than the full value which typically is not achieved before year 3. For example, figure 3 of Crafts and Mills (2013) shows the time paths Table 5 . Accounting for the impact on the public debt ratio of not reversing fiscal consolidation (full multiplier after three years) Self-defeating austerity 121 of both the direct multiplier computed from Equation (4) and an "indirect" multiplier formed by taking into account the effect of news on private and government spending. These show that the full value of the multiplier takes up to three years to be achieved and calculations show that the multipliers from the VAR and local projection methods have similar time paths. Accordingly in table 5, it is assumed that the first (second) year value of the multiplier is one-third (two-third) of the full value, so in the column headed "m = 0.75", the successive values in years 1, 2, and 3 are 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively. The other columns are compiled in similar fashion. Here we see that even with a long-run multiplier of 1.2 a policy of austerity would not be "self-defeating" in that the predicted debt ratio is below the actual. In fact, the long-run multiplier has to be almost 1.5 for the "self-defeating" outcome to be observed. On the basis of earlier estimates of the multiplier such as those of Dimsdale and Horsewood (1995) or Thomas (1983) this criterion would have been met but our estimates suggest this would not have been the case. Our estimates for the government-expenditure multiplier are not only considerably lower than that has been believed by earlier writers but also are out of line with those models which predict that the multiplier will be large in a depressed economy with interest rates at the lower bound. Even so, there is a plausible reason for the multiplier to have been quite modest in the 1930s, namely that the legacy of World War I meant that there was a high ratio of public debt to GDP. Between the late 1920s and the late 1930s this was never less than 140 percent and peaked at nearly 180 percent in 1933 (table 1), the levels at which modern studies find very low multipliers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013) . 17 As Middleton (1985) noted, in the context of a commitment to balanced-budget orthodoxy and the debt overhang, extra government spending led to expectations of higher future taxes (negative wealth effects) in the near future. Any reader of The Economist, with its regular tracking of public finances and commentary on taxes required to balance the budget, would be painfully aware of this and there were regular changes in income tax rates to this end. 18 Indeed, in the debate on the budget in 1933, the Treasury publicly maintained that possible expansionary effects from an unbalanced budget might be vitiated by expectations of future tax increases and that the balanced budget rule meant that any suggestion of a deficit would lead to expectations of higher taxation.
On balance, and notwithstanding the high initial debt ratio and substantial size of the marginal tax and transfer rate, we believe that the evidence suggests that maintaining fiscal consolidation in 1930s' Britain would have led to a larger reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio than was actually observed. It is probable that the value of the multiplier in year 1 was less than 0.47. It therefore seems unlikely that rearmament should be credited with improving this fiscal indicator but, given the favorable configuration of interest rates and growth rates, it was possible to combine rearmament with (slower) reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio. 17 In the aftermath of World War II, when once again there was a legacy of high public debt, Cloyne (2013) finds that during 1955-72 a 1 percentage point cut in taxes raised GDP by 0.3 percent on impact and by 4.6 percent after three years. This was, however, a different situation in that the debt-to-GDP ratio was considerably lower (averaging 95 percent of GDP) and the medium term effects reflected supply-side impacts from changing marginal tax rates, as Cloyne himself notes. 18 The standard rate of income tax was changed seven times (six up, one down) in the 1930s (Sabine, 1970) . Overall, it rose from 20 percent at the start to 35 percent at the end.
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Was there a fiscal "free lunch" in the sense of DeLong and Summers (2012)? In order to address this question, we also need estimates of the values ofẎ , the trend rate of growth of real GDP, and of h, the hysteresis parameter. With regard to the former, our interwar quarterly data set yields an estimate of a trend growth rate withẎ = 1.93 percent per year. 19 This is, in fact, the same as the trend-stationary rate that was estimated for the pre -World War I period by Mills (1991) . For the purposes of the "free lunch" calculation this is unlikely to be a controversial benchmark to choose.
Obtaining an estimate of h is more difficult. Our approach is based on using IMF (2012, annex 1) as a starting point. Their methodology focuses on hysteresis effects that emerge in the form of a higher non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (U * ) being generated by years when real GDP falls below its potential level (Y * ). More precisely, the empirical estimate on which IMF (2012) relies is that each 1 percentage point widening of the cumulative output gap raises U * by 0.14 percentage points, with the implication that Y * falls by 0.1 percent. This is equivalent to setting h = 0.1, the central estimate of the hysteresis parameter assumed by DeLong and Summers (2012) .
We can check the plausibility of assuming that a similar relationship applied in Britain in the 1930s. On the basis of trend growth at 1.93 percent per year, the output gap in 1929 averaged 23.7 percent. Working forward through the 1930s, the cumulative output gap sums to 27.3 percent of GDP, which would imply that U * is predicted to have risen by 3.82 percentage points between 1929 and 1937. The best estimates for U * show an increase of 3.83 percentage points over these years (Dimsdale and Horsewood 1995) . The increase in U * results from various proximate determinants but is essentially driven by the economy's response to the exogenous demand shock of the world economic crisis. Thus, the assumption of h = 0.1 appears quite reasonable, prima facie.
However, this conclusion must be treated with some caution. On the one hand, there may be other contributions to h which would mean the true value exceeds 0.1. These might include the marked increase in long-term unemployment during the 1930s, which probably also contributed to a higher U * although the magnitude of such an effect is unclear (Crafts 1989) , and also a slowdown in the rate of growth of the capital stock. 20 On the other hand, the rise in U * partly reflects policy choices, for example, with regard to the replacement rate. Moreover, it is not clear how far a fiscal stimulus could have averted the rise in U * or the slowdown in capital stock growth and thus underpinned future tax revenues. Even if 0.1 is a reasonable assumption for the value of h, as we assume in what follows, this is no more than a best guess with quite wide margins of error. That said, it would not seem reasonable to suppose that h = 0, which means that there will be some values of the multiplier which would deliver the free lunch. Table 6 uses Equation (2) to calculate the critical values of the real interest rate that would permit a fiscal stimulus to have been self-financing forẎ = 1.93 percent and, as before, t = 0.44. As might be expected, the outcome is quite sensitive to the value of the government-expenditure multiplier. The likelihood of the criterion being met was obviously much greater after Britain had left the gold standard and had entered financial repression, as the data in table 3 confirm. R averaged 5.7 percent in the late 1920s but 2.2 percent from 1934 onward.
Indeed, it seems likely that the free lunch was available in the mid-1930s -for example, if h = 0.1, then even with a multiplier of only 0.5, if the government could borrow at a real interest rate below 4.75, this would be the case. However, on the gold standard in the late 1920s, even if the multiplier was 0.8 the real interest rate facing the British government would have very possibly been too high to meet the criterion. This conclusion is strengthened when it is recognized that interest rates faced significant upward pressure if budgetary policy was viewed as "unsound", as was demonstrated in 1931 (Middleton 1985, p. 94 ).
Conclusions
Contrary to conventional wisdom, our results are that austerity was not self-defeating in 1930s' Britain. In particular, we find that expansionary fiscal policies, including rearmament, meant that the public debt-to-GDP ratio fell more slowly than if the earlier fiscal squeeze had been maintained. The possibility of self-defeating austerity depends on the size of the multiplier; estimates of the multiplier using modern time-series econometrics suggest that it was considerably lower than has been believed until recently and was probably no more than 0.8 even in the long run.
There was a significant reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio between 1933 and 1938. This was compatible with rearmament because despite the relaxation in the fiscal stance the government still ran a primary budget surplus at a time when the real GDP growth rate exceeded the real interest rate at which the government could borrow. The "financial repression" associated with HM Treasury's cheap money policy was conducive to this configuration.
In the mid-1930s, given the presence of hysteresis effects in the labor market, it seems highly probable that there was a "fiscal free lunch" in that deficit-financed government expenditure could improve the flows of tax revenues and transfer payments by enough to pay the interest on the extra debt. However, it is unlikely that this was also the case while Britain was on the gold standard in the late 1920s. Table 6 . Critical values of the real interest rate of government borrowing for fiscal expansion to be "self-financing" (percent) 
